Private Maritime Security Companies v. Pirates: The Battle of Legality by Zehnder, Vanessa
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 15
Private Maritime Security Companies v. Pirates:
The Battle of Legality
Vanessa Zehnder
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vanessa Zehnder, Private Maritime Security Companies v. Pirates: The Battle of Legality, 33 Md. J. Int'l L. 335 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol33/iss1/15
ZEHNDER - PRIVATE MARITIME (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018 12:35 PM 
 
335 
 
Private Maritime Security Companies v. 
Pirates: The Battle of Legality 
VANESSA ZEHNDER† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the blue skies, and amid the calm waters of the Indian 
Ocean, a small boat that appears as a mere dot on the horizon 
approaches a massive cargo ship.1 The serenity of the ocean is quickly 
shattered when a voice calls for warning shots through a radio.2 
Immediately following this order is the sound of rapid gun fire at the 
hands of a private security team.3 While the radio transmission only 
called for warning shots, there is no pause between the initial shots and 
the countless additional shots that follow.4 The gunfire continues for 
over one minute and causes the targeted skiff to lose control and collide 
with the cargo ship prior to drifting off into the horizon.5 Before the 
initial skiff is out of sight, another pirate skiff approaches the cargo 
ship and is met with similar gunfire.6 The situation depicted above 
illustrates the problem of allowing private maritime security 
companies (“PMSCs”) to “self-regulate”7 in the fight against piracy, 
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 1.  J W, Pirates Dead Bodies Floats as Pirates Fails and Shredded to Pieces. Pirates 
Tries to Hijack the Wrong Vessel, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5_oeFLpRvc. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  David Isenberg, The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies, HUFFINGTON 
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which must be solved by implementing regulations for PMSCs to 
follow to protect both American ships, as well as international ships.8 
Piracy is known as the “original universal jurisdiction crime.”9 
Universal jurisdiction enables states to pursue pirates regardless of 
their nationality.10 The region in which piracy is most prevalent, and 
earned the name “Pirate Alley”, is the horn of Africa, which creates 
momentous difficulties because the Gulf of Aden is a heavily traveled 
commercial shipping route.11 While the function of protecting ships 
against piracy is generally performed by the states, in recent times 
there has been a shift towards utilizing PMSCs for such protection.12 
Currently, “quick fix” solutions include using PMSCs as state 
employed anti-piracy task forces and as private security for merchant 
vessels traversing high-risk piracy regions.13 In some cases this has led 
to a presumption of guilt by the PMSC prior to proving guilt, and 
sometimes even a death sentence before proving guilt or providing any 
legal process.14 While it is legal for a state to pursue and seize pirates 
with its military, questions remain in regards to the largely unregulated 
grey area of using PMSCs to protect against piracy.15 
This article will examine piracy as defined by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) and other 
international statutory laws, as well as the history of piracy and the 
lack of regulation for PMSC.16 This article will then argue that PMSCs 
should have the legal ability to protect vessels and their cargo against 
pirates, a function generally performed by states, when performed in a 
regulated manner, by utilizing a mechanism such as letters of marque.17 
Lastly, this article will analyze potential solutions for when PMSCs 
and pirates come into contact without regulation.18 
 
POST (May 29, 2012, 1:50 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/private-
military-contractors_b_1548523.html. 
 8.  Infra Part III(C). 
 9.  Tara Helfman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the 
Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 55 (2012). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Sean Patrick Mahard, Blackwater’s New Battlefield: Toward a Regulatory Regime in 
the United States for Privately Armed Contractors Operating at Sea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 331 (2014). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See J W, supra note 1. 
 15.  Helfman, supra note 9, at 56. 
 16.  Infra Part II.  
 17.  Infra Part III. 
 18.  Infra Part III(C). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Defining and Tracing the History of Piracy 
Those who commit piracy have been labeled “communis hostis 
omnium,” which translates to the “common enemy of all.”19 Piracy is 
internationally defined by UNCLOS as: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation,  
committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship  
or a private aircraft, and directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship  
or aircraft, or against persons or property on board 
such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the  
jurisdiction of any State.20  
Additionally, Article 105 of UNCLOS supports universal 
jurisdiction to enforce against piracy, by providing that “every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft.”21 The United Nations Security 
Counsel passed Resolution 2316, in addition to a variety of other 
resolutions,22  in an effort to provide authorization for nations to pursue 
pirates and to patrol the waters in high risk piracy areas, regardless of 
whether the area is within the high seas or territorial Somali waters.23 
In terms of international law, territorial sea means “the sovereignty of 
a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters 
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea.”24 High seas refer to “the open ocean, not part of 
the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea or internal waters of any 
 
 19.  Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 
Working Paper, 2012). 
 20.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 101 
[Hereinafter “UNCOLS”]. (The United States has signed, but the Senate has not ratified.) 
 21.  Id. at 105. 
 22.  See generally S.C. Res. 1676 (May 10, 2006); S.C. Res. 1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. 
Res. 1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); 
S.C. Res. 1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1976 (Apr. 11, 
2011); S.C. Res. 2015 (Oct. 24, 2011); S.C. Res. 2020 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2077 (Nov. 
21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2383 (Nov. 7, 2017). 
 23.  See S.C. Res. 2316 (Nov. 9, 2016) (Unanimously adopted to renew previous 
resolutions in regards to the fight against piracy and calls on both the Somali authorities and 
the states to do what they can to fight piracy). 
 24.  UNCOLS, supra note 20 at Part II.  
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state.”25 
    We often think of piracy as loosely organized and generally 
committed by poor individuals, that is no longer the reality of the 
situation.26 In Somalia, piracy has become a very lucrative, socially 
acceptable profession and has created a new group of elites who own 
large homes, new cars, and vacation internationally.27 Piracy has 
developed extensively to the point where the tables have turned to the 
rumored point of international businessmen asking pirates for loans.28 
    While piracy has preyed on innocent ships for hundreds of 
years, it has made its appearance on the big screen in many recent 
works.29 The most well-known and realistic depiction being the 2013 
film, Captain Phillips.30 The film’s director, Paul Greengrass, referred 
to the situation portrayed in the film as “a complex portrait of the 
myriad effects of globalization.”31 This film portrays the events of 
April 8, 2009, when Somali Pirates targeted the Maersk Alabama, 
which was en route to East Africa to deliver food aid.32 The situation, 
which occurred 145 miles off the Somali coast, progressed into a 
hostage situation and U.S. military forces ultimately killed the 
pirates.33 While this particular story was turned into a blockbuster hit, 
it shares many similarities with the other 217 pirate attacks in 2009.34  
1. United States 
     In addition to its presence in international law, piracy also has 
roots within the legal system of the United States of America.35 The 
 
 25.  High Seas, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary (online ed.). 
 26.  Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living the High Life, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2008, 9:16 
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  CAPTAIN PHILLIPS (Sony Pictures 2013). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Captain Phillips, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1535109/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2018).  
 32.  Jennifer S. Martin, Fighting Piracy with Private Security Measures: When Contract 
Law Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2010). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Jonathan Saul & Royce Cheah, Piracy Attacks at Six-Year High in 2009: Watchdog, 
REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2010, 8:19 AM), 
https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE60D0DA20100114; CAPTAIN PHILLIPS, supra 
note 29. 
 35.  Piracy Under Law of Nations 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948) (“Whoever, on the high seas, 
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into 
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“To define 
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of 
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United States piracy statute automatically calls for a life sentence.36 
While the definition of piracy seems relatively straightforward, 
multiple legal cases disagree on what exactly is necessary to constitute 
the crime of piracy.37 In the United States courts, the main point of 
contention is whether an actual taking is necessary to constitute piracy 
in the situation of an attempted attack that did not reach the point of a 
successful taking.38 An actual taking is defined as: “a physical 
appropriation of an owner’s property by an entity clothed with 
eminent-domain authority.”39 In the 2010 case, United States v. Hasan, 
the defendants thought they were attacking a merchant vessel, but 
actually attacked a United States Navy vessel.40 The district court held 
that an actual taking is not required to qualify as piracy, and the statute 
can be fulfilled by an “act of violence” committed “on the high seas” 
for “private ends.”41 Similarly, two years later in United States v. Dire, 
the Fourth Circuit found that Congress’ proscription of piracy under 
18 U.S.C. § 1651 “necessarily incorporated modern developments in 
international law” and that UNCLOS article 101 defines general 
piracy42 under modern customary international law.43 Thus, the fourth 
circuit upheld jury instructions which do not require a taking to fulfill 
the crime of piracy.44  
Piracy does not solely target large commercial vessels.45 Pirates 
kidnapped Rachel and Paul Chandlers, an older British couple, from 
their small yacht and held them hostage for thirteen months until their 
family paid the ransom.46 Stemming from another incident, United 
States v. Shibin dealt with Mohammed Saaili Shibin who served as a 
translator on behalf of the pirates that were holding the twenty-two 
person crew of the M/V Marida Marguerite hostage, after they seized 
 
nations”). 
 36.  U.S.C. § 1651. 
 37.  William Crum McKinney, United States v. Said & United States v. Hasan, 62 S.C.L. 
REV. 577 (2011). See United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012); see also United 
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 38.  Said, 680 F.3d; Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d. 
 39.  Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 40.  Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See UNCOLS, supra note 20. 
 43.  United States v. Abdi Wali Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Decca Aitkenhead, Paul and Rachel Chandler: How We Survived Being Kidnapped 
by Somali Pirates, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/30/paul-rachel-chandler-kidnap-somali-pirates. 
 46.  Id. 
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the ship on the high seas.47 Further, the pirates that hijacked the yacht 
“Quest”, identified Shibin as the person responsible for negotiating 
with authorities days before the pirates shot and killed all four United 
States citizen hostages.48 While Shibin did not board the M/V 
Marguerite until the pirates brought it into Somali waters and the S/V 
Quest never made it back to Somalia for him to board, the court held 
he could still be found guilty of aiding and abetting piracy.49 The court 
ultimately found Shibin guilty on all counts with a sentence in excess 
of twelve life terms.50 
2. Somalia 
Both interesting and troubling is that to this day Somalia has not 
successfully passed anti-piracy legislation.51 In 2012, Somali piracy 
cost the international economy a total of USD 5.7-6.1 billion.52 This 
amount comes from a variety of expenses including ransoms, recovery, 
and insurance.53 Things such as security equipment and guards, 
rerouting to avoid high-piracy areas, increased speeds to evade pirates 
leading to higher fuel costs for ships, military operations, and counter-
piracy organizations also add to the high cost.54 Expenses do not stop 
after the pirate attacks occur due to costs of labor, prosecutions, and 
imprisonment of pirates.55 Somalia was not a signatory to the first and 
second UNCLOS negotiations because it had not yet gained its 
independence.56 In order for a state to be a signatory, the state “signs a 
document, personally or through an agent, and thereby becomes a party 
to an agreement.”57  
 
 47.  United States v. Shibin, No. 2:11CR33, 2012 WL 8231152, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 
2012). 
 48.  Id. (During the course of his negotiations, Shibin utilized tactics such as 
psychological and physical torture of the crew of the M/V Marida Marguerite. For a period of 
time while holding the crew hostage, Shibin was in the role of a regular pirate and carried an 
AK-47 and guarded the hostages); Eliza Griswold, How the Somali Pirate Victims Became 
Martyrs, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-somali-
pirate-victims-became-martyrs (Scott and Jean Adam were missionaries that were on their 
way to deliver Bibles to underserved nations). 
 49.  United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Afyare Elmi & Ladan Affi, Barriers to Developing Anti-Piracy Law in Somalia, 
ALJAZEERA CENTRE FOR STUDIES (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/11/2014112010310522448.html. 
 52.  Bellish, supra note 19. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.  
 57.  Signatory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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However, Somalia did adopt the 1959 Marine Code, which was 
prepared during the United Nations trusteeship era, and gave Somalia 
six nautical miles of territorial sea.58 The Marine Code covers piracy, 
and defines it as a crime that is committed by individuals on board a 
ship, punishable by imprisonment for ten to twenty years, regardless 
of whether it occurs in the high seas or territorial waters.59 A 1966 
amendment to the Marine Code of 1959 increased Somalia’s territorial 
sea from six nautical miles to twelve nautical miles.60 In 1972, Somalia 
passed Law 37 in response to the trend of claiming large amounts of 
territorial sea as the negotiation preparations for UNCLOS III began, 
which expanded Somalia’s territorial sea from twelve nautical miles to 
200 nautical miles.61 Interestingly, Law 37 did not mention piracy and 
stated that Somali Penal Law would govern any offenses occurring 
within the territorial sea.62 On January 26, 1989, in order to be in line 
with UNCLOS, Somalia’s National Assembly approved the Somali 
Law of the Sea, Law No. 5, which brought Somalia’s territorial sea 
back down to twelve miles.63 By passing Law No. 5, Somalia once 
again passed a law regarding the sea that made no mention of piracy.64 
Somalia began working on its ratification of UNCLOS III in early 
1989 and repealed Law 37, which led to Somalia becoming the fortieth 
state to ratify the Convention on July 24, 1989.65 The widely held 
public opinion in Somalia, that Kenya is trying to steal its territories 
and resources, has added to the difficulty of passing any laws related 
to the sea and anti-piracy.66 
3. International Approach 
Not all governments utilize the same approach to piracy. In 
addition to the counter-piracy operations of individual states, there are 
multiple international organizations that are active in the fight against 
piracy.67 These include the European Union’s Naval Force Operation 
 
 58.  MARITIME CODE, Preliminary Provision, art. 1: Territorial Sea. (Som.), 
https://somaliswiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/somali-maritime-code-21-03-19591.pdf; 
Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Law on the Somali Territorial Sea and Ports, Law No. 37 (Sept. 10, 1972) (Som.), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/SOM_1972_Law.
pdf.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See generally Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 
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ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation 
Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 
151, the African Union, and the Southern Africa Development 
Community.68 Under European Union Council Joint Action 851, the 
European Union Naval Force ATALANTA provides protection for 
vessels including those of the World Food Programme, African Union 
Mission in Somalia, and at risk shipping vessels.69 Additionally, the 
European Union Naval Force ATALANTA works to “deter, prevent 
and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali Coast.”70 
Ukrainian M/V Juliet was able to thwart off attackers because of the 
protection she received from the force.71 In 2009, the Internationally 
Recognized Transit Corridor was established through the Gulf of Aden 
by the International Maritime Organization.72 Within this corridor, 
coalition naval forces would escort merchant vessels.73 The 
establishment of this guarded corridor led to pirates expanding further 
into the north-west Indian Ocean.74 In October 2017, the European 
Union committed 37.5 million euros towards counter piracy operations 
and other maritime security.75  
While it is typically the United States’ approach to never 
negotiate with the “bad guys,” rumors suggest that the Spanish 
government paid a ransom in excess of 3.5 million dollars for the 
 
2383 (2017), Security Council Renews Authorization for International Naval Forces to Fight 
Piracy off Coast of Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/13058 (Nov. 7, 2017).  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  EU NAVFOR Somalia: Mission, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018); The Council of the European Union, 
Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 301 
OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION 33, 33 (Nov. 10, 2008.   
 70.  The Council of the European Union, supra note 69.  
 71.  Martin, supra note 32, at 1365. 
 72.  The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and 
Piracy in the Indian Ocean, LESSONS FROM PIRACY, 
http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/06/DRAFT-The-Evolution-of-the-Security-
Association-for-the-Maritime-Industry-8-May-14.pdf; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships in Waters of Somalia,  Ref. T2-OSS/2.7.1, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 
(Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/SN.1
-Circ.281.pdf; Introduction to IMO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx (The International Maritime Organization 
is a United Nations agency responsible for regulating international shipping).   
 73.  The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and 
Piracy in the Indian Ocean, supra note 72.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Aiswarya Lakshmi, EU Leads the Way with Ambitious Action for Cleaner and Safer 
Seas, MARINE LINK (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.marinelink.com/news/ambitious-cleaner-
action430100.  
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release of the Spanish fishing ship, Alakrana, and its thirty-six person 
crew.76 The Spanish Prime Minister stated that the “government did 
what it had to do.”77 The United Arab Emirates is currently seeking a 
seat in the decision making body of the International Maritime 
Organisation on the basis of creating increased security.78 Due to 
concerns about the impact of piracy on commercial shipping lanes in 
the region, the United Arab Emirates has taken measures to fight piracy 
both publically and by secretly funding anti-piracy operations.79  
Dating back to the United Nations’ first Resolution regarding 
piracy off the Somali coast in 2006, the United Nations condemned 
acts of piracy.80 In a 2008 Resolution, the United Nations escalated to 
calling for “nations with military capacity in the area to actively fight 
piracy.”81 At a 2017 meeting of the United Nations Security Council, 
the Council again gave primary responsibility in the fight against 
piracy to the Somali authorities, while also recognizing the need for 
international assistance by asking states that have the available 
resources to help.82 In November 2017, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously renewed their “Authorization for International 
Naval Forces to Fight Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.”83 This need for 
international assistance stems from the fact that piracy occurs in an 
area greater than one million square miles of the ocean.84 
Illustrating how parts of the international community work 
around the Somali authorities is that some Western navies will bring 
alleged pirates to states with anti-piracy laws like Kenya, Seychelles, 
and Mauritius to be prosecuted.85 Upon conviction, the United Nations 
 
 76.  Somali Pirates Free Spanish Boat, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2009, 4:31 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8364530.stm.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Ramola Talwar Badam, Updated: UAE’s bid for International Maritime 
Organisation council seat would ‘boost security’, THE NAT’L (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:58 PM), 
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/updated-uae-s-bid-for-international-maritime-organisation-
council-seat-would-boost-security-1.663402.  
 79.  Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Private Army Formed to Fight Somali Pirates Leaves 
Troubled Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/private-army-leaves-troubled-legacy-in-
somalia.html.  
 80.  S.C. Res. 1676 (May 10, 2006). 
 81.  S.C. Res. 1838 (Oct. 7, 2008). 
 82.  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 
2316 (2016), Renewing Authorization for International Naval Forces to Combat Piracy off 
Somali Coast, U.N. Press Release SC/12582 (Nov. 9, 2016).  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Martin, supra note 32, at 1366. 
 85.  Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.  
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Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) relocates some of the inmates 
to facilities in Somaliland and Puntland to serve their sentences.86 
Somaliland “engages in diplomatic operations with the United 
Nations, the Arab League, the European Union and nations” but is not 
a recognized state by the Union Nations.87 The decision by the 
UNODC to send a number of pirates to non-Somali partners for their 
incarceration “perpetuates the status quo.”88 
B. The Grey Area: Legality of Private Security 
While the ability of merchant vessels to protect themselves 
against piracy appears within United States law, the law references 
only “the commander and crew of any merchant vessel” and makes no 
mention of additional contractors, such as private security personnel.89 
To date, no legally binding regulations exist governing PMSCs.90 
While PMSCs are required to follow the laws of the ship’s flagged 
nation, most nations have minimal regulations for them.91 All merchant 
ships are required to be registered to a state; the ship is, however, 
allowed to select the state to which it registers.92 A lot of ships fly a 
“flag of convenience,” which is “one that flies the flag of a country 
other than the country of ownership.”93 Ship owners utilize so-called 
flags of convenience because they provide a way around the more strict 
regulations of other countries in respect to the aspects of wages, ship 
conditions, and working conditions.94 Further complicating this 
general lack of regulation is the unsettling idea that some PMSCs will 
function under ships flagged to countries that do not have any 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  T.G., Why Somaliland is Not a Recognised State, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-explains.  
 88.  Elmi & Affi, supra note 51. 
 89.  33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012) (Authorizes merchant vessels to defend against piratical 
attacks on the high seas; “[t]he commander and crew of any merchant vessel . . . may oppose 
and defend against any aggression” by a nonpublic armed vessel). 
 90.  Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, §1.1, INT’L 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION (May. 25, 2012), 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1-
Circ.1443.pdf.  
 91.  Mahard, supra note 11, at 335. 
 92.  Sharda, What are Flag States in the Shipping Industry?, MARINE INSIGHT (July 23, 
2016), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-are-flag-states-in-the-shipping-
industry-2/.  
 93.  Flags of Convenience, INT’L TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FED’N, 
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-
campaign/.  
 94.  Id. 
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regulations to avoid dealing with any such restraints.95 This troubling 
concept should be solved through the implementation of regulation, 
which can be accomplished by utilizing the letters of marque.96 The 
letters of marque would go beyond the issue of flags and allow the 
PMSC to act on behalf of the state and the state would be able to 
directly exercise control over the PMSC.97 
This issue gained international attention on March 25, 2011, when 
a private security commander aboard a merchant vessel in the Indian 
Ocean ordered his men to fire at an approaching skiff that had not yet 
fired any shots at the vessel.98 As described in the Introduction, the 
privately contracted security personnel did not pause after firing the 
ordered warning shots and continued to fire until the skiff was out of 
sight.99 Trident Group, the United States employer of the guards aboard 
the merchant vessel, later acknowledged that some of the pirates were 
likely killed.100 In summary, employees of a company based in the 
United States, a country where due process is an inherent element of 
criminal justice, allowed its guards to fire in a fashion that any 
reasonable person could expect to kill those on board the skiff, even 
though only warning shots were called for.101 
Additionally, another attempt to attack the aforementioned 
merchant vessel, the Maersk Alabama, was made in November 2009, 
but was unsuccessful because the vessel had contracted with armed 
security personnel.102 This second attempt to attack the Maersk 
Alabama led to a statement from Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, 
Commander of the Central Command, which identified onboard 
security teams as one of the “maritime industry’s best practices” and 
“a great example of how merchant mariners can take pro-active action 
to prevent being attacked.”103 The story of the MV Biscaglia, where the 
security team was unarmed and failed to thwart off a pirate hijacking, 
illustrates the need for security personnel to be armed.104 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See infra Part III(C). 
 97.  See Letters of Marque, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) [Hereinafter 
Definition of Letters of Marque]. 
 98.  See J W, supra note 1.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Mahard, supra note 11, at 334. 
 101.  See J W, supra note 1. 
 102.  Martin, supra note 32, at 1365. 
 103.  Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pirates.html.  
 104.  The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and 
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Officials in the maritime industry agree that there is a “glaring 
absence of regulation” for PMSCs.105 Maritime Officials also claim 
that the number of ships reporting use of a PMSC is approximately half 
as many as actually use a PMSC.106 The United Nations acknowledged 
this lack of oversight in a 2008 statement, saying that with the structure 
of an employee only being held accountable to their employers, which 
is what occurs when there are no additional regulations from states, 
“immunity can soon turn into impunity.”107 This lack of regulation 
coupled with concern over the growing number of PMSCs operating 
without prior maritime security experience led maritime security firms 
to the decision of creating a “code of conduct and ethics” and the 
International Association of Maritime Security Professionals 
(“IAMSP”).108 The IAMSP, a voluntary group that self-regulates, has 
around 400 members, who accounted for “half of the reputable 
industry.”109 A large concern is that hundreds of ‘expatriates’ from Iraq 
and Afghanistan are moving into the maritime security sector without 
the specific necessary knowledge to perform the work of private 
maritime security.110 One of the founders of the IAMSP stated: “We 
have fears that a glut of inexperienced and unqualified so-called 
maritime security operators are bringing the legit guys into 
disrepute.”111 The concern does not end there; a member of the 
seafarer’s union, Nautilus International, stated that: “Private security 
in the marine sector is currently not regulated in the way that it is on 
land . . . [t]here is a big worry this could be opening the doors to a lot 
of cowboys.”112 
III. ANALYSIS 
In 2012, the increase of private security was attributed as one of 
three main factors related to the decrease in pirate attacks that year.113 
 
Piracy in the Indian Ocean, supra note 72. 
 105.  Mahard, supra note 11, at 336.  
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U.N. NEWS CTR. (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25924.  
 108.  See Code of Practice, INT’L ASS’N OF MAR. SECURITY PROF., 
http://iamsponline.org/membership/code-of-practice/; Jonathan Saul, Facing Piracy, Ship 
Security Firms Set Ethics Code, REUTERS (May 9, 2011, 8:28 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-shipping-security-piracy/facing-piracy-ship-security-
firms-set-ethics-code-idUSLNE74804X20110509. 
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While such force is at times utilized by law enforcement officers and 
armed services members, regulations exist for those state actors, and 
authority is given based on such regulations. In the context of maritime 
security, the possibility of killing potentially innocent parties 
increases, while the ability to collect evidence and adjudicate 
decreases.114 Even in authorized capacities, use of force and force 
escalation are hot-button issues in today’s society, which makes the 
issue all the more important.  
Piracy spans an area of approximately one million square miles 
of the ocean, thus regulating individuals of many different nationalities 
who fight against piracy is a very complex task.115 The United States 
Navy “encourages” ship owners to hire armed security, but some 
maritime organizations remain concerned that “armed guards may 
increase the danger to ships’ crews or that overzealous contractors 
might accidentally fire on fishermen.”116 Prior incidents involving 
United States private security companies have shown a presumption of 
guilt prior to being proven guilty course of action without any form of 
legal process, which goes against the very foundation of the United 
States’ criminal justice system.117 Even when most nations, 
organizations, and experts agree that such regulation is necessary, 
there is no clear-cut route to creating and implementing such 
standards.118 Finding a “one size fits all” solution is complicated by the 
involvement of individuals of various nationalities, the sheer size of 
the affected ocean, crossing into territorial waters of other states, and 
the high-risk interactions of security forces and pirates.  
A. Previous Attempts at Finding a Solution 
An early attempt at a solution was the development of the 
Puntland Maritime Police Force.119 Puntland is a self-declared 
autonomous state located in the north-east region of Somalia.120 
Founded by the former head of Blackwater Worldwide, Erik Prince, 
 
2012, 6:01 AM), http://allafrica.com/stories/201207231573.html. 
 114.  Isenberg, supra note 7.  
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 116.  Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pirates, FOX NEWS (Oct. 26, 
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somali-pirates.html. 
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YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJcG0cPtJO8.  
 118.  Mahard, supra note 11.  
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the creation of this Force did not occur without its share of 
controversy.121 From countless mercenaries to millions of dollars in 
secret payments from the United Arab Emirates, to a trainee being 
beaten to death at a force training camp, the development of a 
sophisticated anti-piracy fighting force was not what many had hoped 
for.122 While the Force did have successes, its unsavory incidents did 
not go without notice by the United Nations, which called the creation 
of the group a “‘brazen, large-scale and protracted violation’ of the 
arms embargo in place in Somalia.”123 This alone illustrates the dangers 
and complexity of the largely outsourced fight against piracy in the 
Somalia region. In light of the troubled path of this so called “private 
army,” the United States, through its officials, stated that it did not 
endorse the creation of such a private army.124 Somewhat contrary to 
the statements of the United States officials is that the Puntland 
Maritime Police Force shared some buildings with the Puntland 
Intelligence Service, which received training from the United States’ 
Central Intelligence Agency.125 Further, Blackwater was placed under 
investigation for the 2007 killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians.126 While 
this incident occurred on land, the involvement of Blackwater and 
other similar PMSCs in the fight against piracy highlights the dire need 
for the self-regulation of this industry to come to an end to prevent 
other such incidents from occurring.127  
B. Complications 
A large complication in the search for a suitable solution is the 
weakness of the Somalian legal system. As previously mentioned, 
Somalia has still not managed to successfully implement anti-piracy 
legislation.128 Transparency International ranked the country of 
Somalia as “the most corrupt on earth.”129 In the rare instances of 
prosecutions occurring in Somalia, the sentences have been largely 
inconsistent.130 Abshir Boyah, a high-level pirate leader, received a 
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mere five-year sentence, while some low-level pirates have received 
twenty-year sentences.131 This discrepancy was viewed as corruption 
between high-level “pirate kingpins” and government officials.132 
Further, Somalian President Sheik Sheriff Sheik Ahmed issued a 
diplomatic passport to a pirate leader, Mohamed Abdi Hassan 
‘Afweyne’, which only further fueled speculation of corruption 
between the Somali government and high-level “pirate kingpins.”133 
C. Solutions 
A strong potential solution is to bring back letters of marque. In 
the simplest terms, at its core, the purpose of the letter of marque is to 
right a private wrong.134 Letters of marque are defined as “a license 
authorizing a private citizen to engage in reprisals against citizens or 
vessels of another country.”135 Letters of marque serve as “permits for 
private individuals to use force against enemies of the state on its 
behalf.”136 This old-fashioned document could be modernized and used 
to provide regulation in the world of piracy and private security. After 
the early 18th century, the purpose of the letter of marque shifted to be 
used as a State instrument to provide permission for national navies to 
“capture and plunder enemy ships.”137  
Although the United States has not recently utilized letters of 
marque, the United States Constitution provides for letters of marque 
in Article I section 8.138 The particular circumstances at hand in this 
situation, from the international occurrence to the use of private actors, 
make it the perfect situation to utilize the letters of marque.139 Using 
letters of marque as a solution would provide a permit for a PMSC to 
utilize force against pirates, which are enemies of the state, on behalf 
of the state. 
   While the 1856 Paris Declaration “banned” letters of marque, 
this is irrelevant because although the United States has respected the 
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Declaration during military conflicts, the United States never formally 
accepted the Declaration.140 In respect to utilizing letters of marque as 
an international solution, it could either be added to UNCLOS or a new 
treaty could be created. While the United States would have no issues 
with using letters of marque as is, if a new treaty was to be formed or 
added to UNCLOS for international use, letters of marque could be 
slightly altered so that other states who formally assented to the 1856 
Paris Declaration can also utilize this solution without violating the 
Declaration.141 Further, there are many differences between the threat 
faced today and the threat faced in 1856, in addition to many 
differences between the privateers of concern in 1856 and today’s 
PMSCs. Due to substantial developments in technology since 1856, 
the ability of pirates to attack large merchant vessels has increased.142 
The ability of pirates to reach a much larger area of the ocean to 
commit such attacks has also increased.143 Taking these factors into 
consideration in addition to global developments in prosecution, 
investigation, and oversight since 1856, letters of marque, or a slightly 
varied instrument, could be utilized internationally while still 
respecting the concerns held by a select few countries regarding letters 
of marque in 1856.144 
This solution would serve to close the gap that is the lack of 
regulation of PMSCs because the security personnel would be 
authorized by their state and could act in the same capacity as state 
actors.145 Further, this solution would provide room for some 
government control.146 Providing such permits does open the door for 
potential abuses of power. However, the government would be able to 
hold individuals who abuse such power accountable through 
prosecution because they would be acting as state actors and subject to 
prosecution as such. UNCLOS Article 107 limits “a seizure on account 
of piracy” to only “warships or military aircraft, or other ships or 
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service 
and authorized to that effect.”147 Utilizing letters of marque as a 
solution would not conflict with UNCLOS Article 107 because the 
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PMSC would be authorized as a state actor.148 
Another potential, yet complicated, solution is the use of contract 
doctrine to provide regulation for PMSCs. However, the complexity 
and high-risk nature of providing a contract for PMSCs who are 
expected to risk their lives to protect a ship and sometimes kill pirates 
prior to the pirates ever receiving a trial or any form of legal process, 
likely goes beyond the control of standard contract doctrine.149 In the 
incident discussed previously, the PMSCs were under employment 
contracts and the contracts did not prevent such an incident, which led 
to the deaths of one or more alleged pirates that did not yet attack the 
ship being protected by the PMSC, without any form of due process.150 
Additionally, PMSCs have been known to work around their contracts 
and any current regulations by way of things such as dropping their 
weapons into the ocean prior to entering weapons-restrictive ports and 
other “creative workarounds to avoid the stiff fines and penalties levied 
by developing and often rightfully paranoid nations in Africa and the 
Middle East.”151  
Further complicating matters is that a contract would possibly be 
breached if security personnel decided to not put their lives in danger 
and to not protect the ship, which is what they were hired to do. If the 
ship’s owner brought a claim of breach, the PMSC would probably 
then defend against a potential claim of breach using the common law 
doctrine of impracticability or another similar defense.152 The common 
law doctrine of impracticability provides a defense when “the duty to 
be performed becomes unfeasibly difficult or expensive for a party 
who was to perform.”153 Utilizing contract doctrine under these 
circumstances is more likely to end in years of circular arguments and 
expensive litigation, than in an actual workable solution for regulation 
of PMSC.   
However, the Montreux Document could potentially be integrated 
by utilizing contractual tools. This Document covers “pertinent 
international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed 
conflict.”154 The Montreux Document serves as a reminder of 
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international humanitarian law obligations of PMSCs and their armed 
contractor employees.155 The Document has been predominantly 
applied to armed conflicts that occur on land.156 In order to apply this 
document to piracy off the coast of Somalia, the presumption that such 
piracy is not “armed conflict” under international law would need to 
be overcome.157 The Document defines the covered group, “private 
military and security companies,”  as “private business entities that 
provide military and/or security services” including “armed guarding 
and protections of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and 
other places . . . .”158 The Montreux Document suggests that private 
military and security companies be subject “to prosecution if they 
commit conduct recognized as crimes under applicable national or 
international law.”159 PMSCs working to protect against piracy fulfills 
the definition of a PMSC given in the Montreux Document.160 To 
utilize the Montreux Document in the current scenario using contract 
doctrine, states would hire a PMSC through a contract which includes 
provisions of the Montreux Document.161 The Montreux Document 
provides states with criteria for the selection of a PMSC and terms of 
use in the contracting process.162  
The conflict between PMSCs and pirates is certainly an “armed 
conflict” in the sense of both sides being armed. However, it is 
questionable whether this conflict will meet the level of “armed 
conflict” discussed in the Montreux Document because the armed 
factor of this conflict is not as large as with armed conflicts on land 
where there are thousands of casualties. As made apparent in the 
November 2017 meeting of the United Nations Security Council, the 
United Nations is in need of further international support in the 
counter-piracy fight because what has been done thus far has not been 
enough, which potentially leaves room for a different approach.163   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The unregulated, violent interactions164 between pirates and 
PMSCs and the lack of state interference, are indicative of a need for 
regulation. While the situation is extremely intricate due to the lack of 
proper enforcement by the Somali government and the use of non-state 
security forces, potential solutions do exist.165 Utilization of PMSCs 
has been shown, in conjunction with other efforts, to decrease the 
amount of pirate attacks. However, in some cases the cost of 
prevention has led to killings at the hands of PMSCs without any 
specific regulation.166 While utilizing and reforming traditional 
contract doctrine in conjunction with the Montreux Document could 
be useful, letters of marque appear to be the most promising solution. 
This is due to the fact that letters of marque would provide 
authorization for private individuals to act on behalf of the government 
and thus allow governmental control and avoid violating UNCLOS 
Article 107. Particularly, this solution puts an end to PMSCs, 
especially those that have no formal training in maritime security, 
exercising force at their own discretion. As seen on video,167 such 
regulation is desperately needed to avoid continuing on a track of 
executions without any form of legal process.  
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